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19781 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
beyond substantial question. In People v. Coleman, the Court deter-
mined that a right to counsel attaches after the issuance of a court
order of removal directing defendant's appearance at a prearraign-
ment lineup; however, this right may be waived in the absence of
an attorney if one has not been retained or appointed. It is hoped
that The Survey's discussion of these and other developments will
serve to aid the practitioner in keeping abreast of the major develop-
ments in New York practice.
ARTICLE 2-LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 202: Cause of action for personal injuries by plaintiff not in
privity with manufacturer accrues, for purposes of borrowing
statute, in jurisdiction where injury occurred
Under CPLR 202 New York courts are required to apply a for-
eign jurisdiction's statute of limitations to causes of action which
accrue in that jurisdiction, if to do so would render the suit of a
nonresident plaintiff time barred.' Until recently there has been a
conflict of opinion on the proper application of this statute to ac-
tions brought to recover for personal injuries caused by defective
products.2 In such actions, the plaintiff has had a choice of using
£ CPLR 202 (McKinney 1972) provides:
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be
commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state
or the place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that where
the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by
the laws of the state shall apply.
CPLR 202 represents an attempt to prevent "forum shopping" by non-resident plaintiffs
seeking to benefit from New York's generous statutes of limitations. See Martin v. Julius
Dierck Equip. Co., 52 App. Div. 2d 463, 468, 384 N.Y.S.2d 479, 483 (2d Dep't 1976), affl'd, 43
N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978); Daigle v. Leavitt, 54 Misc. 2d 651, 283
N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1967); [1943] N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 146; 1
WK&M T 202.01. Essential to the application of CPLR 202 is the determination of where
the cause of action accrued. Traditionally, a cause of action was deemed to accrue in the place
of the wrong, lex loci delicti. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLmCTS LAW § 132 (1968). In order
to avoid the harsh results often produced by this rigid test, many jurisdictions, including New
York, adopted a "grouping of contacts" or "significant governmental interests" approach
under which a cause of action is deemed to "accrue" in the jurisdiction most closely related
to the events in litigation. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). See generally
RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 142, Comment f (1971); Ester, Borrowing
Statutes of Limitations and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962); Gegan, Where
Does a Personal Injury Action Accrue Under the New York Borrowing Statute, 47 ST. JOHN'S
L. REY. 62 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gegan]; Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts
Between Statutes of Limitations, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1975); Comment, Choice of Law and
the New York Borrowing Statute: A Conflict of Rationales, 35 ALB. L. REv. 754 (1971).
2 Compare Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 52 App. Div. 2d 463, 384 N.Y.S.2d 479
(2d Dep't 1976), affl'd, 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978), with Myers v.
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 40 App. Div. 2d 599, 335 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1st Dep't 1972).
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either a tort theory or a warranty theory.3 A particular problem
arises when the nonresident plaintiffs suit sounds in breach of war-
ranty, since, for purposes of applying CPLR 202, the cause of action
may be deemed to have accrued in either the jurisdiction in which
the sale occurred or the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff was in-
jured.4 This problem was addressed in Martin v. Julius Dierck
Equipment Co.,5 wherein the Court of Appeals held that, regardless
of the theory used, a cause of action for personal injuries resulting
from a defectively manufactured product accrues in the jurisdiction
in which the injury occurred.6 In dictum, the Court went on to state
Jurisdictions other than New York have also had difficulty in determining where and when a
cause of action accrues where personal injuries are the result of a defectively manufactured
product. A majority of jurisdictions have held that such suits, even if they are labeled breach
of warranty, sound in tort and therefore are deemed to accrue at the time and place of injury.
See, e.g., Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ill.
1971); Tyler v. R.R. Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971); Public Adm'r v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Creviston v. General Motors Corp. Fla., 225
So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1969); Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp. La., 232 So. 2d 285 (La. 1970); Parish v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J.
130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). In a few jurisdictions, however, courts have held that a breach of
warranty cause of action, based on personal injuries, accrues upon tender of delivery. See,
e.g., Peeke v. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 403 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hodge v.
Service Mach. Co., 314 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Rufo v. Bastian Blessing Co., 417
Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965). One commentator has noted that for reasons of policy, the
determination of the situs of accrual for purposes of CPLR 202 should be handled differently
than a determination of accrual for an action under ordinary New York statutes of limita-
tions. This author reasoned:
While the Court of Appeals has yet to pass on the question, all indications are that
when a product is manufactured in one state and sold to a user in another state
where it causes injury the action in strict products liability is governed by the law
of the buyer's state, the state whose "general security" has been disrupted and
which has the responsibility for compensating the victim and satisfying his credi-
tors.
Gegan, supra note 1, at 65-66 (footnote omitted).
See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976);
Victorson v.- Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1975); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). In
Victorson, the Court of Appeals stated that, depending on the facts in each case, a party who
is injured by a defectively manufactured product may maintain an action against the seller
under three theories: breach of express or implied warranty, strict products liability, and
common-law negligence. Privity of contract with the seller was unnecessary, regardless of the
theory chosen. See generally Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict
Liability, 24 TENN. L. Rv. 963 (1957); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rv. 791 (1966).
The availability of alternative theories has provided injured persons with the opportunity
to select the most beneficial statute of limitations. The applicable period for bringing an
action in strict products liability or negligence is 3 years from the date the injury occurs.
CPLR 214 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978). An action for breach of warranty, however, must
be brought within 4 years of tender of delivery. UCC § 2-725 (McKinney 1964).
See notes 1 & 3 supra.
43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978), aff'g 52 App. Div. 2d 463, 384
N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1976).
6 43 N.Y.2d at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
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that the breach of warranty remedy is no longer available at com-
mon law to an injured plaintiff who is not in privity with the seller
of a defective product.7
Plaintiff Martin, a resident of the District of Columbia, was
injured in Virginia on June 7, 1968, as a result of the malfunctioning
of a forklift truck owned by his employer.8 The truck had been
manufactured and delivered in New York, the principal place of
business of both the manufacturer and the distributor Alleging
causes of action in negligence and breach of warranty, the plaintiff
instituted suit in New York on May 21, 1971, against the distributor,
and on June 21, 1971, against the manufacturer." Defendants
moved for summary judgment, arguing that, since the plaintiff had
been injured in Virginia, CPLR 202 required that that state's 2-year
statute of limitations for personal injury" be applied to bar both
causes of action. 12 The Supreme Court, Queens County, held that
the negligence claim accrued in Virginia on May 29, 1969, plaintiff's
twenty-first birthday, 3 and was therefore time barred under the
Virginia statute. The breach of warranty claim, however, was held
to have accrued in New York, where the truck was delivered, and
was thus timely under the 4-year New York limitations period. 5 On
Id. at 589-90, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
S Id. at 587, 374 N.E.2d at 98, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
Id.
I Id.
" VA. CODE § 8.01-246 (1977) allows 3 years within which to bring an action based upon
"any unwritten contract, express or implied," but contains an additional limitation:
Provided that as to any action to which § 8.2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code
[(warranties)] is applicable, that section shall be controlling except that in prod-
ucts liability actions for injury to person . . . the [2-year] limitation prescribed
in § 8.01-243 shall apply.
See note 14 supra. See Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969);
Friedman v. Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968). The Martin
plaintiff's action, therefore, would have been time barred if Virginia law were deemed applic-
able.
.2 43 N.Y.2d at 587, 374 N.E.2d at 98, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
13 Since the plaintiff was a minor at the time of his injury, the running of the statute of
limitations was tolled until he attained majority. Id.; see CPLR 208 (McKinney Supp. 1977-
1978); VA. CODE § 8.01-229 (1977).
" 43 N.Y.2d at 587, 374 N.E.2d at 98, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 186. Since the negligence action
in Martin accrued in Virginia, CPLR 202 required the application of that state's 2-year
statute of limitations, which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, every action for personal injuries, what-
ever the theory of recovery, . . . shall be brought within two years next after the
cause of action shall have accrued.
VA. CODE § 8.01-243 (1977); see note 11 supra.
25 43 N.Y.2d at 587, 374 N.E.2d at 98, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 187. The Court relied on the
rationale in Myers v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 40 App. Div. 2d 599, 335 N.Y.S.2d 961
(1st Dep't), modifying per curiam 69 Misc. 2d 729, 330 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1972). The Myers plaintiff, a Kentucky resident, was injured in Kentucky by a defective tire
1978]
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appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, hold-
ing that the breach of warranty claim was tortious in nature and
therefore accrued in Virginia, the situs of the injury." Utilizing
CPLR 202, the court applied the Virginia statute of limitations 7 and
dismissed the second cause of action.'
8
Affirming the appellate division's decision, the Court of Ap-
peals stated that the cause of action which the plaintiff had labeled
breach of warranty was actually one sounding in strict products
liability. 9 Writing for the majority,"0 Judge Jasen reasoned that an
action against a remote seller for personal injuries resulting from a
defective product is fundamentally different from one which seeks
to restore to the plaintiff the benefit of his bargain. 2' Thus, in Judge
Jasen's view, the fact that a plaintiff not in privity attaches a breach
of warranty label to his claim should not affect the determination
of where and when his cause of action accrued. 22
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Martin Court stressed
that it was not rebuilding the "citadel of privity," which had been
discredited in a series of earlier decisions. 23 Instead, Judge Jasen
stated, the Court was merely eliminating a theory of recovery which
manufactured in and delivered F.O.B. New York. The first department held that the negli-
gence claim accrued upon injury in Kentucky, but that the warranty claim accrued in New
York at the time of the sale. 40 App. Div. 2d at 599, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 961-62.
11 52 App. Div. 2d at 467, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 483. The appellate division reasoned that "the
'life' of the fork lift truck in [New York] was limited to a dormant and transitory interval
between its manufacture and shipment to . . . Virginia." Id. at 467, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
Noting that the injury upon which all claims were predicated occurred in Virginia, the court
determined Virginia to be the state with the most significant interest in the litigation. Id.;
see note 2 supra.
' See notes 11 & 14 supra.
" 52 App. Div. 2d at 468, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
" 43 N.Y.2d at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 99, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
Joining Judge Jasen in the majority opinion were Chief Judge Breitel, and Judges
Jones and Wachtler. Judge Gabrielli dissented in part and filed a separate opinion in which
Judges Cooke and Fuchsberg concurred.
21 43 N.Y.2d at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188; see, e.g., Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 402, 335 N.E.2d 275, 278, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43 (1975);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965). See generally W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 92 (4th ed. 1971); Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts
Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1974). The
Martin majority stressed the distinction between a contract remedy, which attempts to place
the parties in the "position they would have been in if the agreement had been performed,"
and a tort remedy, which is designed to place the injured party "in the position he occupied
prior to his injury." 43 N.Y.2d at 589, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188. This distinc-
tion, however, would appear to have little significance in a defective products action, since
express statutory provision has been made for the recovery of "consequential" damages for
personal injuries resulting from a breach of warranty. UCC § 2-715 (McKinney 1964).
2 43 N.Y.2d at 589-90, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
" Id. at 590, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188; see, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32
[Vol. 52:485
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had been rendered obsolete by the "evolution of an alternative rem-
edy in strict products liability. '24 In the Martin Court's view, the
availability of this remedy had made "unnecessary the distortions
previously required to permit injured plaintiffs to recover from those
who put defective products into the stream of commerce. '25 The
amendment of UCC § 2-318 in 1975, extending to parties not in
privity the right to sue the seller for breach of warranty, 28 was not
deemed controlling since the cause of action in Martin accrued prior
to that date.2 The Martin majority nevertheless indicated that it
might reach a similar conclusion in a case arising under the new
statute .
28
In contrast, the Martin dissent would have preferred to follow
the "principles inherent in the statute" and allow the plaintiff to
proceed under a breach of warranty theory." Writing for the dissent,
Judge Gabrielli asserted that the plain language of the amended
statute demonstrates the legislature's intention to provide a breach
of warranty remedy separate and distinct from any common-law
right of action in strict products liability."0 Since the plaintiffs suit
sounded in breach of warranty rather than tort, Judge Gabrielli
would have invoked UCC § 2-725, which provides that such causes
N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195,
173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
2, 43 N.Y.2d at 590, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
2 Id., 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188; see note 35 infra.
29 Ch. 774, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1208 (McKinney). The former statute limited the
parties who could bring a breach of warranty action to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
Although this provision represented a modification of the strict privity rule, it failed to
provide an adequate remedy for all those who might be injured by defectively manufactured
products. The need for a broader remedy was met by the evolution of a common-law cause
of action in strict products liability. See note 33 infra. Ultimately, the legislature eliminated
the privity requirement entirely by enacting the present version of UCC § 2-318 (McKinney
Supp. 1977-1978), which provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
21 43 N.Y.2d at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
2 Id. Acknowledging the position taken by the dissent, see text accompanying note 29
infra, Judge Jasen "view[ed] unnecessary further discussion of ... section 2-318," but
"note[d] the likelihood of disagreement as to its effect should a case arise in which its
applicability may properly be considered." 43 N.Y.2d at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d
at 189.
43 N.Y.2d at 595, 374 N.E.2d at 104, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
Id. at 595, 374 N.E.2d at 103, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 191-92 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
1978]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:485
of action accrue upon tender of delivery." Thus, in the dissent's
view, CPLR 202 required application of the longer New York limita-
tions period and a finding that plaintiff's breach of warranty action
was timely.2
Viewed narrowly, the Martin decision may be interpreted as
holding that, in the absence of privity, actions for personal injuries
resulting from defective products will be analyzed by the Court in
accordance with tort principles, regardless of the label the plaintiff
affixes to his suit. Thus, suits brought for breach of warranty, to
which the amended provisions of UCC § 2-318 are applicable, will
be treated as tort actions for purposes of applying CPLR 202 and
other procedural rules. Such an interpretation would render Martin
consistent with a line of cases in New York which have rejected the
mechanical use of contract principles where the act giving rise to the
cause of action is tortious in nature.33
31 UCC § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). Although section 2-725 refers only to the time the cause
of action accrues, Judge Gabreilli stated that "it would appear to follow logically that such
an action would also accrue at the place of tender of delivery." 43 N.Y.2d at 596, 374 N.E.2d
at 104, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
Id. at 596-97, 374 N.E.2d at 104, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). The
Martin dissent rejected the majority's view that a plaintiff not in privity could not maintain
a breach of warranty action. Noting that the Martin majority had revived "the once toppled
walls of the citadel of privity," Judge Gabrielli stated that the plaintiff's breach of warranty
action should have been recognized. Id. at 593-94, 374 N.E.2d at 102, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 190-91
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
31 An historical evaluation of the New York cases suggests that the Martin holding may
be the logical culmination of two decades of legal development. In Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), the Court stated that
"breach of law-implied warranties" was a tortious wrong and dispensed with the requirement
of privity. Id. at 436-37, 191 N.E.2d at 82-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95. The Goldberg Court
indicated that strict tort liability was "surely a more accurate phrase" to describe plaintiff's
cause of action. Id. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595. Six years later, in Mendel
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), the
Court indicated that "strict liability in tort and implied warranty in the absence of privity
are merely different ways of describing the very same cause of action." Id. at 345, 253 N.E.2d
at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494. The Mendel Court chose to recognize and apply only the con-
tract statute of limitations, stating that "it would be absurd to have two different periods
of limitation applicable to the same cause of action, with the same elements of proof, com-
plaining of the very same wrong." Id., 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95. In a 1973
action brought for negligence and breach of warranty, Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298
N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), the Court stated that breach of an implied warranty
resulting in personal injury is a "tortious wrong," which may form the basis of an action in
strict products liability, even in the absence of privity. Id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 345
N.Y.S.2d at 469.
In Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1975), the Court of Appeals formally recognized a separate cause of action in strict
products liability. In extending the remedy to non-buyers and non-users of a defective prod-
uct, the Victorson Court suggested that, in the past, the courts merely had used contract
rather than tort language to describe what was essentially tortious liability. Id. at 401-02,
335 N.E.2d 4t 277-78, 873 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43; see 2 L. FRUMMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
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In a broader context, the Martin decision may be interpreted
as a suggestion by the Court that the legislature reconsider the
viability of the statutory breach of warranty remedy in light of the
availability of a fully developed common-law action in strict prod-
ucts liability. It has been observed that "the warranty rationale of
strict liability for injury caused by defectively, though non-
negligently, manufactured products was merely temporary scaffold-
ing, useful in constructing the new tort, but to be dismantled once
the structure was complete." 4 Now that New York has expressly
approved the strict products liability remedy, there would appear
to be no need to retain an additional remedy within a statutory
scheme that was designed to govern commercial relationships. 5
Susan Kaufman
ARTICLE 32-ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3211: Court of Appeals modifies showing necessary to gain
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action
Upon the hearing of a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action,36 section 3211(c) permits either
LumiLrry § 16A[5][g] (1975), wherein the authors suggest that the Goldberg Court's use of
warranty language rather than tort concepts had an influence on the Mendel Court's decision.
Finally, in Micallef v. Miehle, 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976),
the Court reaffirmed its position by stating that a cause of action for breach of implied
warranty "based on tortious behavior, is more correctly treated under the theory of strict
products liability." Id. at 387, 348 N.E.2d at 578-79, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (citation omitted).
" Gegan, supra note 1, at 64.
" While the breach of warranty remedy and the tort remedy appeared superficially
compatible, their underlying theoretical inconsistencies led to anomalous and sometimes
illogical results. See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), overruled in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395,
335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
CPLR 3211(a)(7) provides: "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more
causes of action asserted against him on the ground that . the pleading fails to state a
cause of action . . . ." A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR
3211(a)(7) ordinarily is made before the answer is filed. CPLR 3211, commentary at 33
(McKinney 1970). The motion may be used simply to test the legal sufficiency of the plead-
ing. Alternatively, the movant may use extrinsic material to attack the factual bases of the
complaint. Id. at 30. The use of evidentiary matter in support of the motion, however, was
drastically limited in Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 357 N.E.2d 970, 389
N.Y.S.2d 314 (1976) (per curiam); see note 39 infra.
In opposition to the motion the plaintiff should request leave to replead in the event of
dismissal. See CPLR 3211(e). In addition, the plaintiff should submit or the court may require
evidence in support of a new or amended pleading in order to satisfy the court that there are
sufficient grounds to support a new cause of action if the present one is dismissed. See id.
Finally, the court may "treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment" after adequate
notice to the parties. CPLR 3211(c). This discretionary conversion can be utilized when the
record on the motion to dismiss is "as complete as it would be on an outright motion for
summary judgment.. . ." CPLR 3211, commentary at 48 (McKinney 1970). It should be
